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Abstract
We set up a theoretical model, in which the policy maker of a tourism
destination has to choose how to allocate the limited natural resource
￿land￿between private holiday accommodations (i.e. second homes) or
hotels. In a framework of partial equilibrium, the policy maker mini-
mizes a loss function which measures the loss of political consensus and
is de￿ned by a linear combination of the policy maker and the local com-
munity preferences.
We can obtain both a corner solution, in which we have extreme
choices of only holiday houses or only hotels, and an internal solution,
in which we have a linear combination of them. To do that the policy
maker can use as economic policy instruments either standard policies
(indirect control - a Pigou tax - or direct control - regulation) or non-
standard policies (a reinvestment commitment of the ￿rm in the tourism
destination). The ￿nal policy maker decision was made by assessing the
welfare consequences of the policy implications.
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11 Introduction
Policy makers managing tourism resorts often face an economic policy problem
related to tourism investments. This dilemma concerns the allocation of the
limited natural resource ￿land￿between either private holiday accommodations
(second homes)1 and hotels. This potential policy dilemma arises particularly
in recently established tourism destinations and also in expanding ones.
In the literature a similar issue has been addressed2 in a framework in which
a policy maker has to impose a tax on land to be allocated among new hotels
(homogeneous buildings). This ￿Pigouvian￿tax could provide a useful policy
instrument if the policy maker were sensitive to the negative externalities asso-
ciated with using land to build hotels; land which could instead be devoted to
more environment friendly activities3. Our approach will move beyond these
analysis by considering a speci￿c extension of the choice set and the policy
alternatives. We develop a static and linear model, in which the building ￿rm
has two substitute choice variables - either hotels or second homes (non homo-
geneous buildings) - while the policy maker should choose between a Pigouvian
tax and other alternative policy instruments.
The dilemma inherent in this policy issue is brought about by a clash of
interests between the policy maker and the building ￿rm. It emerges when the
policy maker has to decide wether to give planning permissions for building
private holiday accommodations or hotels. Two main stylized facts would bear
out this issue:
￿ the average market price (market value per square meter) of new private
holiday accommodations is often higher than the market price of new
hotels4;
￿ the ￿impact e⁄ects￿ , measured in terms of costs and employment, of the
two alternative choices are analogous. However the ￿tourism multiplier
e⁄ect￿on local economic development is higher for hotels, because hotel
guests tend to have a higher average daily per capita expense (in terms
of indirect tourism expenses)5.
With respect to the ￿rst stylized fact, the characteristics of the two kinds
of buildings (hotels and second homes) which can bring about di⁄erent market
1￿Second homes￿are private holiday accommodations which are left unoccupied for most
of the year and are mainly used during periods of peak demand for tourism accommodation
(Jaakson, 1986).
2See, for example, Piga (2003a).
3In particular, Piga (2003a) considers a dynamic policy game between the policy maker
and a monopolistic ￿rm in a tourism area. The ￿nal outcome of his work suggests that the
tax alone cannot lead to the socially optimal level of land use.
4See Mazzucchelli (2007): in this analysis the di⁄erence between the market prices of new
second homes and new hotels in Italy is estimated to be on average equal to 40-45%.
5See Piga (2003b, p. 900): ￿Moreover, self-catering accommodations, such as second
homes, do not generate such high multiplier e⁄ects as hotels￿. Mazzucchelli (2007) estimates
that the average daily per capita expense of international hotel guests in Italy is 46% higher.
2prices are:
1. second homes may represent a ￿nal durable consumption good while ho-
tels are an instrumental good. Therefore hotels are a higher risk invest-
ment;
2. the building ￿rm￿ s production function yields, ceteris paribus, to a higher
number of marketable square meters (i.e. output) for second homes than
for hotels, since hotels are characterized by a large number of accommo-
dation services;
3. second homes last longer than hotels and therefore have a lower depreci-
ation rate;
4. hotels have higher management and maintenance costs as their occupa-
tion rate is higher than for private holiday accommodations.
With respect to the second stylized fact, we point out an observable styl-
ized fact: investment in second homes yields immediate employment growth
but, at the same time, it leads to a type of tourism with lower development
rates. However, the pro￿t margin of the investment in private holiday accom-
modations can be considerably higher than the pro￿t margin of investment in
hotels.
The building ￿rm and the policy maker of the tourism destination can have
incompatible goals. Tourism investments, both in second homes and hotels,
may generate environmental negative externalities6, though investment in ho-
tels may bring about positive externalities (tourism multiplier e⁄ect) o⁄setting
(at least partially) the negative ones. Investments in second homes would
induce a ￿net￿negative externality because the positive e⁄ects (tourism multi-
plier e⁄ect) would not be o⁄set by the negative e⁄ects (environmental e⁄ect).
In this paper we set up a partial, static equilibrium theoretical model, in
which the policy maker minimizes a loss function measuring the loss of political
consensus. This function is de￿ned in terms of a linear combination of the
policy maker and the local community preferences. The model￿ s agents are:
(i) the policy maker, who draws up the tourism destination-planning scheme;
(ii) the building ￿rm, which builds and sells private holiday accommodations
and hotels on the market. The control variables are the square meters of area
usable for building, given the disposable land (physical constraint), the prices
of private holiday accommodations and hotels and the building costs.
We shall analyze di⁄erent economic policy scenarios in order to obtain a
solution to our economic policy problem. We shall consider standard policies
(indirect control, a Pigou tax, or direct control, regulation) or non-standard
policies (a reinvestment commitment of the ￿rm in the tourism destination).
The ￿nal policy maker￿ s decision is made by assessing the welfare consequences
of the possible solutions.
6See Piga (2003a).
3The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the model is set up. In sec-
tion 3 the corresponding optimization problems are solve and the enforceable
economic policies are analyzed. In section 4 the optimal investment decisions
for both the tourism destination and the building ￿rm are discovered. In con-
clusions a comparative analysis between the di⁄erent solutions of the problem
in terms of "welfare consequences" is made. In Appendix the results of a nu-
merical simulation of the model are shown.
2 The Model
We assume two interacting agents: (i) the policy maker of the tourism destina-
tion, which draws up the tourism destination-planning scheme; (ii) one price
taker building ￿rm, which builds private holiday accommodations and hotels
and then sells them.
The building ￿rm is assumed to be a non-local company (or a multinational
company), such that its investments are to be considered as foreign direct
investments and its pro￿t does not belong to the residents7. Moreover, we
assume the ￿rm has a restricted ￿nancial budget (liquidity constraint) to invest
in buildings within the tourism destination and it is a price taker ￿rm because
we analyze its choices in the short-run and we argue it acts in a ￿small open
economy￿ , in which the market prices are well known to be ￿xed by the ￿rest of
the world￿ . The private holiday accommodations and hotels market prices are
therefore taken as constant (exogenous variables), as well as the building costs
and so the pro￿t margins, while the control variables are the square meters
(SM) of area built by the ￿rm as private holiday accommodations or hotels,
given the disposable land and capital. The ￿rm, as usual, is pro￿t maximizing.
On the contrary, the policy maker of the tourism destination is interested in
minimizing a loss function, which measures the loss of political consensus8 and
is de￿ned by a linear combination of the policy maker and the local community
preferences. Precisely, from the mentioned stylized facts we assume that the
following parameters a⁄ect the policy maker loss function:
￿ a negative weight for hotels built by the ￿rm (therefore a positive weight
in terms of welfare);
￿ a positive weight for private holiday accommodations built by the ￿rm
(therefore a negative weight in terms of welfare);
￿ a negative weight (therefore a positive one in terms of welfare) for the
7For example, in 1997 a multinational company, Ciga Immobiliare, prepared a ￿master-
plan￿(development scheme) for a part of Costa Smeralda on the Northeast coast of Sardinia
(Italy).
8The ￿loss function￿ of the policy maker can be interpreted like a measurement of the
loss of its political consensus, for example lost votes, such that a zero value means ￿no lost
votes￿, while a positive value signals a certain amount of ￿lost votes￿.
4building area (in square meters) planned in the tourism destination-
planning scheme but at last not utilized.
Notably, this last variable can be regarded as a proxy variable of the full
employment in the tourism destination: if the square meters of built area are
less than those planned in the tourism destination-planning scheme, we derive
that all the local economic district is underemployed, its land, its labour and
its capital.
In this model, we specify all the functions as linear combinations in order
to obtain a largely intuitive solution. This choice implies both the necessity
to apply the linear programming technique and a polarization of the problem
solutions into ￿all or nothing￿ programs. Nevertheless, this simpli￿cation is
easily removable, without changing the substance of the argument, by assuming
quadratic functions both for pro￿t and loss functions, or by specifying the prices
as endogenous variables.
The variables of the model are:
1. the land variables, x (SM built as hotels), y (SM built as private holiday
accommodations), s ￿ x + y (SM of total area built by the ￿rm), S ￿
￿ x+ ￿ y (SM of building area according to the tourism destination-planning
scheme, where ￿ x and ￿ y are the SM of building area respectively as hotels
and private holiday accommodations), ￿ S (SM of total area disposable in
the tourism destination), where S ￿ ￿ S (physical constraint) and s ￿ S
(institutional constraint);
2. the building ￿rm variables, p (selling price of one SM built as hotel), v
(selling price of one SM built as holiday house), c (building cost of one
SM), m = p ￿ c (pro￿t margin on each SM built as hotel), n = v ￿ c
(pro￿t margin on each SM built as holiday house), ￿(x;y) = mx + ny
(pro￿t function, with n > m)9, F (liquidity constraint, i.e. ￿nancial
resources, credit and corporate capital disposable to invest in the tourism
destination)10;
3. the tourism destination variables, S ￿ s (di⁄erence between the SM of
building area and the SM of total built area), a ￿ 0 (political consensus
to the tourism destination, e.g. in terms of number of lost votes, for the
SM of built area, higher or lower than those planned), b ￿ 0 (political
9For simplicity (see equation 3) and without loosing generality of results, we assume
that the building costs per SM (c) are the same for hotels and holiday houses. Given this
assumption on costs and the previous stylized fact (v > p) then n > m. Note that this
assumption and this stylized fact of the model does not necessarily require nor that the
building costs per SM (c) are the same for hotels and holiday houses neither that their
average market prices per SM (v and p) are di⁄erent. On the contrary, it is crucial that the
pro￿t margin per SM from the investment in holiday houses is su¢ ciently higher with respect
to the investment in hotels.
10The introduction of a liquidity constraint is equivalent to introduce a "credit rationing"
hypothesis. As we will see in the Conclusions, one further policy instrument could consist in
relaxing this constraint.
5consensus to the tourism destination for the SM built as private holiday
accommodations), d ￿ 0 (political consensus to the tourism destination
for the SM built as hotels), L
0
(x;y) = a(S ￿ s)+by +dx (loss function,
which measures the loss of political consensus su⁄ered by the policy maker
of the tourism destination)11.
We formulate the hypothesis of polarization of the preferences of the tourism
destination policy maker, a;b > 0 and d = 012, such that the loss function
becomes: L
0





b (S ￿ s) + y, that can be expressed as:





b and ￿ = a
b (with ￿ > 1 if a > b and ￿ < 1 if a < b).
In this way, we have all the elements to formulate the optimization problems
of the two agents, under the hypothesis that there is not strategic interaction
between them13.
Problem 1 (Tourism Destination Program) The tourism destination￿ s goal
is to minimize its loss function subject to an institutional constraint such that
the optimization problem is:
Min
x;y L(x;y) = ￿(S ￿ s) + y
s.t. s = x + y ￿ S (2)
whose solution is: ￿ x = S, ￿ y = 0, that represents the optimal tourism destination-
planning scheme for the policy maker, such that the optimal total built area is
￿ s = ￿ x + ￿ y = S and therefore the optimal loss is L(￿ x; ￿ y) = 0. Within this
solution all the building area should be therefore at last built as hotels.
Proof. By de￿nition s ￿ x + y, therefore by substituting s in the target
function, we obtain L(x;y) = ￿(S ￿ x ￿ y) + y, whose minimum is achieved
in a straightforward way for ￿ y = 0, such that according to the institutional
constraint ￿ x = S and therefore ￿ s = ￿ x = S.
11The building ￿rm￿ s pro￿t does not enter into the policy maker loss function because the
￿rm is a non-local company and its pro￿t does not belong to the residents by assumption.
12In spite of this hypothesis of polarization of the policy maker preferences, it is possible
to obtain a ￿mixed equilibrium￿ (internal solution) even with linear functions. As we will
see in Problem 5, we can obtain both a corner solution (in which we have extreme choices
of only holiday houses or only hotels) and an internal solution (in which we have a linear
combination of them).
13For simplicity we do not consider physical constraint S ￿ ￿ S.in the following optimization
problems.
6Problem 2 (Building Firm Program) The building ￿rm￿ s goal is to maxi-
mize its pro￿t function subject to a liquidity constraint, such that the optimiza-
tion problem is:
Max
x;y ￿(x;y) = mx + ny




whose solution is: x￿ = 0, y￿ = F
c , such that the optimal total built area is
s￿ = y￿ = F
c and therefore the optimal pro￿t is ￿(x￿;y￿) = nF
c . Within this
solution all the building area should be therefore at last built as private holiday
accommodations.
Proof. The pro￿t function is linear with respect to x and y, therefore the
maximum pro￿t is achieved by investing all the ￿nancial resources to build the
SM of area which give the highest pro￿t margin. Since n > m we obtain a
straight solution y￿ = F
c and x￿ = 0 as conditions for the maximum of ￿(x;y).
Since the optimal choices of the building ￿rm do not overlap with tourism
destination￿ s goals, this situation generates a policy problem. The standard
economic policy instruments provided by the political economics literature to
face these kinds of policy problems are: (i) indirect control instruments (Pigou
tax/subsidy); (ii) direct control instruments (direct regulation). We shall see
the enforcement of both the standard economic policies and furthermore we
shall analyze the e⁄ects of non-standard economic policies.
3 The Standard and Non-Standard Economic
Policies
We assume that the disposable ￿nancial resources to invest in buildings at
the tourism destination can not be transferred to another di⁄erent tourism
destination or economic sector. In other words, we hypothesize to manage
￿speci￿c investments￿because of the institutional nature of the ￿rm (i.e. its
objective function).
3.1 Pigou Tax
One of the most important standard indirect economic policy that the policy
maker can enforce, consists of introducing a tax in order to indirectly discourage
the private agents from doing something unwanted. In this case it consists of
introducing a tax t on the pro￿t margin of each SM of area built by the ￿rm
as private holiday accommodations (i.e. a tax on the earnings obtained from
the selling of private holiday accommodations), in order to discourage the ￿rm
from building them. This tax, called Pigou Tax, must be of a size such that it
7holds the following equivalence between the pro￿t margins of the two kinds of
investments:
n(1 ￿ t) < m (4)








Problem 3 (Pigou Tax) Given the tourism destination-planning scheme con-




￿(x;y) = mx + n(1 ￿ t)y
s.t. x + y ￿
F
c
and s = x + y ￿ S (6)
whose possible solutions are:
1. if F
c < S then x1 = F
c , y1 = 0, such that the optimal total built area is
s1 = x1 = F
c and the optimal pro￿t is therefore ￿(x1;y1) = mF
c ; in this
case only a portion of the building area is at last utilized, with an excess







c ￿ S then x1 = S, y1 = 0, such that the optimal total built area is
s1 = x1 = S and the optimal pro￿t is therefore ￿(x1;y1) = mS, situation
in which all the building area is at last utilized but the ￿rm remains with





In any case, all the disposable resources (building or ￿nancing resources)
are at last built as hotels: the tourism destination does not collect any tax
yield (nty = 0) but its goal in terms of typology of buildings is achieved.
Proof. The pro￿t function is linear with respect to x and y, therefore the
maximum pro￿t is achieved by investing all the ￿nancial resources to build the
SM of area which give the highest net pro￿t margin. Since as a result of the
Pigou tax n(1 ￿ t) < m, we obtain a straight solution y1 = 0 and therefore
x1 = F
c . If F
c = S then all the building area is at last utilized, while if F
c > S
then the ￿rm can not build all the SM of area allowed by its ￿nancial capital
and will be forced to limit itself to the tourism destination-planning scheme
constraint S by setting x1 = S.
3.2 Direct Regulation
The most usual standard direct economic policy consists of a direct regulation of
the economy by the policy maker. In this case it is su¢ cient to introduce within
the tourism destination-planning scheme some quantitative constraints, that is
8y ￿ 0 (no planning permission to build private holiday accommodations)14
and s ￿ S (tourism destination-planning scheme constraint or institutional
constraint).
Problem 4 (Direct regulation) Given these constraints the building ￿rm
optimization problem becomes:
Max
x;y ￿(x;y) = mx + ny
s.t. x + y ￿
F
c
, y ￿ 0 and s = x + y ￿ S (7)
whose possible solutions are exactly the same as in the case of Pigou Tax (see
Problem 3):
1. if F
c < S then y2 = 0 and therefore x2 = F
c , such that the optimal total
built area is s2 = x2 = F
c and the optimal pro￿t is therefore ￿(x2;y2) =
mF
c ; in this case only a portion of the building area is at last utilized,







c ￿ S then y2 = 0 and therefore x2 = S, such that the optimal total
built area is s2 = x2 = S and the optimal pro￿t is therefore ￿(x2;y2) =
mS, case in which all the building area is at last utilized but the ￿rm





Proof. The pro￿t function is linear with respect to x and y, but it is not
possible to build private holiday accommodations, therefore y2 = 0 and the
only possible pro￿t ￿(x2;y2) = mx2 is achieved by investing all the ￿nancial





The two economic policies described in Problems 3 and 4 yield the same
solution for the ￿rm, but in the case of the Pigou Tax the solution y = 0
is the outcome of a ￿rm￿ s choice, while in the case of Direct regulation the
solution y ￿ 0 is the consequence of conformity with the law: in public eco-
nomics literature, these are standard economic policy instruments. However
the tourism destination achieves the absolute minimum value of the loss func-
tion L(x;y) = 0 only if the ￿nancial resources of the ￿rm are high enough
(liquidity constraint not binding):
￿ if F






> 0 for i = 1;2;
￿ if F
c ￿ S then yi = 0 and si = S, therefore the optimal loss is L(xi;yi) =
0 for i = 1;2.
14The quantitative constraint y ￿ 0 is the optimal solution of the tourism destination
program (see Problem 1) and it represents therefore a ￿rst best solution. An alternative
quantitative constraint, like y < x or y < k (where k ￿ x is a constant), would represent a
second best solution.
9In the ￿rst case (if F
c < S), where the loss for the tourism destination is not
zero (it is not at its absolute minimum value), it is necessary to verify whether
it is possible to ￿nd a more e¢ cient economic policy that can cut down the
loss (e.g. the number of lost votes). Let us therefore analyze a typology of
non-standard economic policy: an investment commitment of the building ￿rm
in the tourism destination15.
3.3 The Reinvestment Commitment Policy
When the ￿nancial resources of the ￿rm are not su¢ cient to achieve the ab-
solute minimum value of the tourism destination loss, the liquidity constraint
is binding (i.e. F
c < S) and it is possible to enforce an economic policy that is
more e¢ cient than the previous ones (see Problems 3 and 4), without imposing
the condition y ￿ 0 but at the same time enforcing the tourism destination-
planning scheme constraint (or institutional constraint) s ￿ S. This policy
consists of introducing a commitment for the building ￿rm to reinvest all its
earnings obtained from the selling of private holiday accommodations, that is
introducing a budget constraint in the form of:
￿F = ny (8)
In this case the building ￿rm has at its disposal an amount of ￿nancial resources
equal to:
F + ￿F = F + ny (9)
Problem 5 (Non-Standard Policy: the Reinvestment Commitment)
-Therefore its optimization problem becomes:
Max
x;y ￿(x;y) = mx + ny
s.t. x + y ￿
F + ny
c
and s = x + y ￿ S (10)
whose solution is: x3 =
F￿S(c￿n)
n , y3 = Sc￿F
n only if F ￿ S (c ￿ n) > 0 and
c ￿ n > 0. The optimal pro￿t is therefore ￿(x3;y3) =
m[F￿S(c￿n)]
n + Sc ￿ F,
while the optimal loss is L(x3;y3) = Sc￿F
n since the optimal total built area
is s3 = x3 + y3 = S. Even when the starting ￿nancial resources are not high
enough (F
c < S) all the building area is eventually utilized in the end thanks to
the higher ￿nancial resources due to the reinvestment of the earnings coming
from private holiday accommodations.
Proof. The corner solutions must be rejected: (i) x3 = 0, y3 > 0 is not feasible
because if some private holiday accommodations are built, the ￿rm obtains
15As we have seen in Note 10, one possible extension of this model could consist in relaxing
the liquidity constraint, which would represent a further non-standard policy instrument. We
are grateful to Claudio Piga for this useful observation.
10earnings that must be reinvested into the building of hotels; (ii) x3 > 0, y3 = 0
is not an optimal solution insofar as been proved in the previous cases (since
n > m). The only solution, if it exists, is therefore in some ￿interior solution￿
(x3 > 0, y3 > 0) that can be computed by solving the system of equations




c￿nx (with c ￿ n > 0, that is 2c > v)
y = S ￿ x
(11)
whose solution is: x3 =
F￿S(c￿n)
n , y3 = Sc￿F
n only if F ￿ S (c ￿ n) > 0
and c ￿ n > 0. It is straightforward then to verify that the optimal pro￿t is
￿(x3;y3) =
m[F￿S(c￿n)]
n + Sc ￿ F and that all the building area is at last
utilized, s3 = x3 + y3 =
F￿S(c￿n)+Sc￿F
n = S, such that the optimal loss
becomes equal to L(x3;y3) = y3 = Sc￿F
n .
The three Problems 3, 4 and 5, which describe the di⁄erent possible eco-
nomic policies, represent typical problems of linear programming in the space










Budget constraint without reinvestment
Figure 1 - The solutions A and B are not feasible or dominated solutions.
The solution E(x > 0 ; y > 0) is an optimal solution. In point E
there is full equilibrium, given both the reinvestment
commitment and the full utilization of the building area.
The two lines depicting the budget constraint (or reinvestment commit-
ment) and the institutional constraint (or building area constraint) are no
longer parallel but the reinvestment commitment, that depends on the value
of y, yields the possibility of an intersection between the two constraints. In
11this way, the constraints cause a ￿vertex￿and therefore the chance of an inte-
rior solution (or mixed equilibrium) x;y > 0, only if the parametric conditions
c￿n > 0 and F ￿S (c ￿ n) > 0 hold. Furthermore, if ￿ > 1 and F
c < S this last
solution, as we shall show in the next Section, dominates all the other possible
economic policies and we can not rule out the possibility that the outcome will
be higher also in terms of ￿rm pro￿t.
4 Welfare Comparison of the Economic Policies
To conclude the model we have to de￿ne the values of the parameters for which
the non-standard economic policy that we called "reinvestment commitment
policy" (see Problem 5) dominates, or at least is indi⁄erent to, the standard
direct or indirect policies (see Problems 3 and 4). In fact, as we have shown,
these standard policies yield the same results which are suboptimal if the ￿-
nancial resources of the ￿rm are not su¢ cient to build all the disposable area
(i.e. if F
c < S).
In other words, since the ￿nal policy maker￿ s decision is made by assessing
the welfare consequences of the possible solutions, we need to verify if and when
the results of the non-standard policy are more e¢ cient:
￿ if the loss function achieves a lower value (for the tourism destination),
i.e. if the "reinvestment commitment policy" is welfare improving (see
Proposition 6);
￿ if the pro￿t function achieves a higher value (for the building ￿rm), i.e.
if the "reinvestment commitment policy" is self-enforcing and therefore
the commitment is credible (see Proposition 7)16.
Proposition 6 (Tourism Destination Optimal Choice) With reference to
the direct regulation policy (see Problem 4), but the same conclusions can be
easily extended to the Pigou tax policy (see Problem 3), it is possible to show
that:
L(x3;y3) ￿ L(x2;y2) i⁄ ￿ ￿ 1 or a ￿ b (12)
If the policy maker of the tourism destination attaches more importance to
the goal of the full utilization of the building area as planned in the tourism
destination-planning scheme (i.e. to the parameter a, which is also a proxy
variable of the local full employment) than to the negative externality on the
tourism economy brought about by the construction of private holiday accom-
modations instead of hotels (i.e. to the parameter b), then the "reinvestment
commitment policy" dominates the standard economic policies.
Proof. Since F
c < S (the ￿nancial resources of the ￿rm are not su¢ cient),
we take into consideration the optimal loss functions computed in the cases of
16Obviously, in this case there is no longer the necessity of monitoring the commitment at
all.

























But since n = v ￿ c by assumption and v < 2c from (11), inequality that can




and therefore ￿ ￿ 1 (15)
Recalling the de￿nition of the parameter ￿ = a
b, this condition implies that a ￿
b, parameters of the loss function that measure tourism destination preferences
in terms of political consensus, depending from the di⁄erent land allocations.
Proposition 7 (Building Firm Optimal Choice) With reference once again
only to the direct regulation policy (see Problem 4), it is possible to show that:
￿(x3;y3) ￿ ￿(x2;y2) i⁄ pv ￿ c(2p ￿ c) (16)
In conclusion, the building ￿rm might also prefer the ￿reinvestment com-
mitment policy" instead of being subjected to an exogenous direct regulation
policy, but this is true only under speci￿c conditions in terms of prices (p and
v) and costs (c). If these conditions hold, the solution of the budget constrained
(reinvestment commitment policy) can be therefore chosen by the ￿rm itself.
Proof. Since F
c < S, we take into consideration the optimal pro￿t functions
computed in the cases of direct regulation (see Problem 4) and reinvestment
commitment (see Problem 5):
￿(x3;y3) =
m[F￿S(c￿n)]
n + Sc ￿ F ￿ mF
c = ￿(x2;y2)
mc(F ￿ Sc + Sn) + nc2S ￿ ncF ￿ mnF
Sc(mn + nc ￿ mc) ￿ F (mn + nc ￿ mc)
(17)
On condition that mn + nc ￿ mc ￿ 0, we therefore obtain:
Sc ￿ F (18)
that is veri￿ed by assumption (F
c < S). We have then to develop the parametric
condition mn + nc ￿ mc > 0:
nc + m(n ￿ c) ￿ 0 (19)
13Recalling the de￿nitions of the parameters m = p ￿ c and n = v ￿ c, this
condition implies that:
vc ￿ c2 + (p ￿ c)(v ￿ 2c) ￿ 0
pv ￿ c(2p ￿ c) (20)
This condition represents a constraint on the exogenous variables prices (p and
v) and costs (c) and only when this condition is present then the building ￿rm
might also gain advantage (in terms of total pro￿ts) from budget constraint
(reinvestment commitment policy) rather than undergoing the building con-
straint (direct regulation policy).
5 Conclusions
It is important to assess the welfare consequences of the di⁄erent possible eco-
nomic policies. The previous Proposition 6 shows that if the tourism destina-
tion attaches much value to the full utilization of the building area (and thus
to local full employment), i.e. if a > b17, then a non-standard economic policy
is the more e¢ cient option. Such a policy consists of:
1. a planning permission to build private holiday accommodations;
2. a binding budget constraint of the earnings obtained from selling the
second homes (reinvestment commitment policy).
Other standard economic policies18 can be therefore less e¢ cient if the
￿nancial resources of the ￿rm are not su¢ cient to build all the area originally
planned in the tourism destination scheme. This ine¢ ciency emerges when the
positive net externalities associated with building only hotels are dominated by
the negative externalities brought about by an excess and non-utilized building
area.
For the reinvestment commitment policy to be e⁄ective, both the built
area and the actual reinvestment of the earnings (obtained from selling private
holiday accommodations) must be monitored by the local policy maker. In
other words, monitoring the commitment is a tricky problem.
Moreover, the previous Proposition 7 shows that only if the prices and costs
of the building ￿rm support the condition for the preference of a reinvestment
commitment solution - rather than undergoing an exogenous constraint, i.e. if
pv ￿ c(2p ￿ c) - then the problem of monitoring the commitment does not
exist any more. In this case the policy would in fact be self-enforcing. It can
17Under a political point of view this condition means that the tourism destination policy
maker looses more consensus (votes) in case of partial utilization of the building area than
for the SM of area built by the ￿rm as private holiday accommodations.
18The other standard economic policies consist in (i) no permitting to build holiday houses
(direct control) or (ii) introducing a tax only (or more) on the earnings obtained from selling
holiday houses (indirect control).
14be favorable for the ￿rm itself to suggest an agreement with local authorities
enforcing self-monitoring so as to avoid external interventions. In this way, the
agreed solution could also take the form of a self-regulation, e.g. the building
￿rm which works in the sector of private holiday accommodations could mimic
a sort of non-pro￿t organization (NPO).
Corollary 8 In the case of the reinvestment commitment policy (see Problem
5), if F < Sc then the absolute value of the SM built as hotels is lower than
those imposed by the standard economic policies (see Problems 3 and 4).





nF > cF ￿ c2S + ncS
F (n ￿ c) > Sc(n ￿ c)
(21)
Dividing by n ￿ c < 0 both the terms we obtain:
F < Sc (22)
that is veri￿ed by assumption.
In other words, the tourism destination ￿pays￿ for the advantage of the
full utilization of the building area (s3 > s2) in terms of fewer SM of hotels
built (x2 > x3). From the point of view of the building ￿rm, moreover, un-
der the previous condition pv ￿ c(2p ￿ c), the ranking of its pro￿ts will be:
￿(x￿;y￿) ￿ ￿(x3;y3) ￿ ￿(x2;y2). The building ￿rm would therefore prefer
not to have any restriction at all (see Problem 2), but if some constraints are
introduced by the policy maker, then even the ￿rm would prefer to endorse
the reinvestment commitment policy rather than be constrained by a severe
regulation.
Another non-standard economic policy that could be implemented instead
of the "reinvestment commitment policy" consists in relaxing the liquidity con-
straint of the building ￿rm, i.e. the credit rationing hypothesis. All the pub-
lic interventions that facilitate the possibility to borrow for the building ￿rm
(i.e. credit facilities) represent possible examples of such a non-standard policy
(public-private partnerships in developing the land, project ￿nancing, subsi-
dized credit, no-interest bearing credit, public credit, etc.)19.
Finally, we conclude the paper with a possible extension to our model. A
dynamic model could be implemented by specifying how the total built area
s(t) = x(t)+y (t) evolves over time, according to a law of motion of this type:
_ s(t) = f (_ x; _ y;t) ; s(0) = 0 ; s(t) ￿ ￿ S .
19Nevertheless, since we do not consider the implementation costs of the economic policies,
we can not say which is the more e¢ cient one (second best analysis). We are grateful to
Claudio Piga for suggesting this implementation.
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6 Appendix: a Numerical Exercise
We present a numerical example of the model, whose results in terms of the
endogenous variables are showed in the following Table 1. To compute these
results, we ￿x the following numerical values for the exogenous parameters of
the model:
￿ S = 1000 SM;S = 800 SM;F = 2500;p = 6;v = 7;c = 4;￿ = 2
so that the pro￿t margins are:
m = 6 ￿ 4 = 2 and n = 7 ￿ 4 = 3
and the pro￿t and loss functions:
￿(x;y) = 6x + 16y and L(x;y) = 2(800 ￿ s) + y
For these values all the most important parametric conditions of the model
hold: F < Sc (2500 < 3200); n > m (3 > 2); c ￿ n > 0 (4 ￿ 3 > 0);
17F ￿ S (c ￿ n) > 0 (2500 ￿ 800 ￿ 4 + 800 ￿ 3 > 0); pv > c(2p ￿ c) (42 > 32);
￿ > 1 (2 > 1).
In Table 1 we observe how the optimal choices of the tourism destination and
the building ￿rm represent a clash of interests that justi￿es an economic policy
intervention both in ￿xing the building area and in preventing the permission
to build private holiday accommodations. In particular, since the ￿nancial
resources that the ￿rm has at its disposal are lower than those necessary to
utilize all the building area, the only binding constraint is those preventing to
build private holiday accommodations.
Table 1: Numerical simulation of the model.
Policy Hotels(x) S.Homes(y) Built area(s) Loss(L) Pro￿t(￿)
Tourism Destin. 800 0 800 0 1600
Building Firm 0 625 625 975 1875
Direct Regulat. 625 0 625 350 1250
Reinv.Commit. 567 233 800 233 1833
Through the numerical simulation we can compare the outcomes of the
direct regulation policy (see Problem 4) and the reinvestment commitment
policy (see Problem 5). In this example, with the shown values of parameters,
in the case of direct regulation policy (see Problem 4) 175 SM of area remain
not built (800￿625), with a ￿political￿loss for the tourism destination equal to
350 votes, lower than in the case of absence of any regulation (975 votes). For
this reason, a direct regulation policy in the form a planning scheme introducing
some institutional constraints is better than an absence of any regulation.
Nevertheless, if thanks to a reinvestment commitment policy (see Problem
5) the policy maker can give some planning permission to build private holiday
accommodations, then the SM of area built by the ￿rm as hotels are higher
than those built as private holiday accommodations (the typology of tourism
prevailing in the destination is still hotel based), but even more interesting
is that now the ￿political￿loss for the tourism destination decreases (233 vs.
350). For this reason, a reinvestment commitment policy is better than a direct
regulation policy ￿xing a severe planning scheme.
Finally, since 1875 > 1833 > 1250, which con￿rms the conclusion above
stated (see Corollary 8), also in this example the ￿rm itself prefers to o⁄er to
the policy maker the solution of a credible self-regulation, so that a contractual
agreement with the tourism destination can be realized.
18